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Usury, when a borrower pays his lender the amountof the loan plus an additional sum as well, hascaused problems for the law since the Middle
Ages. In Canon Law and later common law, usury, any
usury, was prohibited. By the sixteenth century the
situation had changed. Usury was beginning to be seen as,
if not exactly beneficial, then a fact of life in a rapidly
developing economy. Providing that legal rates of interest
were not exceeded, usury was permitted. By 1713 the rate
of legal interest had fallen as low as five per cent. In these
circumstances it is not perhaps surprising that, whilst some
money lenders kept within the law, others did not.
Escaping the statutory maximum rate of interest was
simply a question of disguising the true nature of the
transaction. Robert Ord, writing in the early nineteenth
century, complained:
After a long contest between the usurer and the legislature,
the ingenuity of the former hath prevailed over the authority
of the latter; for the legislature have never yet been able to
extirpate the practice of usurers, to get extravagant interest.      
When Oliver Goldsmith observed that there is, “Scarce
an Englishman who does not almost every day of his life,
offend with impunity against some express law”, he might
almost have had the usurer in mind. Such was the state of
things by 1820 that Robert Comyn was able to list 15
different types of loan transactions which fell outside the
statute. Although judges, including Lord Hardwicke and
Lord Mansfield, railed against evasion, they were
hamstrung by the way in which usurious transactions were
defined in law. Provided that the transaction involved a
hazard, so that the lender was not certain to recoup his
money, it was not within the legal definition of usury. Lord
Mansfield made some efforts to stress substance over form
but it was doubtful whether even this technique was
effective in the face of a determined evader. Perhaps one
device, the annuity for the life of the seller, more than any
other came to encapsulate the problem by the mid-
eighteenth century.
ANNUITIES FOR THE LIFE OF THE SELLER:
A STUDY IN AVOIDANCE
Such was the popularity of the annuity for the life of the
seller as a device for avoiding the statutory restrictions on
usury that a Parliamentary Commission of the 1770s labelled
it a “public nuisance.” The concept was a simple one. A
lender (the buyer) offered a borrower (the seller) a capital
sum (the principal). In return the borrower undertook to
pay a fixed sum of money per year (the annuity) for the rest
of his life. The period taken to repay the principal (the years’
purchase) was usually six years. Where the loan was riskier
because the borrower was in poor health or lacked good
security the years’ purchase might be shorter. In a simple
example, A (the borrower) sells an annuity of £1,000 a year
for his own life to B (the lender) at six years’ purchase. In
return B pays A £6,000 as a capital sum. The lender’s profit
(or interest) came from the annual payments he hoped to
receive after the elapse of six years.    
The future Lord Chancellor, Thomas Erskine, called an
annuity for the life of the seller a “scandalous contract”,
noting that “there is no honest trade so lucrative.” The risk
that the seller might die before the principal was repaid
meant that the annuity for the life of the seller was outside
the legal definition of usury. By insuring the life of the
seller, buyers could protect themselves in the event of an
early death.     
Even when life insurance was used the transaction was
not usurious. The appearance of a hazard was enough to
take an annuity for the life of the seller outside usury. A
Parliamentary Committee recommended regulating the
prices at which the annuities could be sold, which would
have meant that the lender’s profit could not exceed the
statutory maximum for usury. The Annuity Act of 1777 did
not incorporate such far reaching reform. Instead a scheme
for registration of annuities was introduced which probably
had a minimal impact on the scale of the trade. One writer
described the statute as “useless.” In the absence of
effective statutory regulation and in place of a common law
alternative, equity would play an important role in
regulating loan transactions of all types.
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THE DEMAND FOR LOANS AND EARLY
EXAMPLES OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
In the eighteenth century, as now, there were plenty of
people who wanted to borrow money for a whole variety of
reasons. High levels of borrowing amongst the aristocracy
were not uncommon. The gaming mania of the early
eighteenth century depleted many fortunes. The
aristocracy also had greater access to consumer goods than
ever before, which inevitably ate up capital. In an era of
economic expansion businessmen were also borrowing
significant sums.  That some were forced to borrow at
usurious rates can be explained, in part, by a private credit
market that was weakened by a series of financial crises and
growing government debt. The low levels of lawful interest
may even have made the situation worse. With such small
profit margins, some more respectable lenders were less
willing to loan money in the absence of very good
securities. Taken together this amounted to a major social
problem which attracted a good deal of comment. One of
these commentators, Daniel Defoe, in, The Complete English
Tradesman, observed that, “the tragic stories of tradesmen
undone by usury are so many and the variety so great.”
If the loan fell outside the legal definition of usury there
was little that the common law was willing to do unless there
were other grounds to avoid the transaction such as fraud or
illegality. The Court of Chancery was more likely to
intervene. Hugh Bellot described the position before 1750:
The reports of cases…are very meagre, and it is difficult to
ascertain whether they proceeded on any uniform principle;
but it may be assumed that the policy of the Court of
Chancery was to relieve against what were called catching
bargains, which were transactions looked upon as evasions of
the usury laws then in force and which transactions were very
narrowly watched.     
During this early period there was no consistent
terminology let alone consistent application of clear legal
rules. Equitable relief can only be described as a series of
situations displaying some common characteristics.  Many
of the authorities were concerned with attempts to evade
the usury laws and involved heirs.      
Before the rise in popularity of the annuity for the life of
the seller, another device was popular with those who
wished to avoid the statutes on usury. A borrower
approached a lender or an intermediary. The lender then
agreed to sell the borrower goods at a grossly extravagant
price on credit. In order to avoid problems of proof later
on, a bond was usually used. The borrower sold the goods
for less than he had agreed to pay. The lender’s profit was
the difference between the price paid by the borrower and
the sum that he himself could have achieved for the goods
had he sold them himself. 
In Fairfax v Trigg ((1677) Rep Temp Finch, (1961) 79
Selden Society 448) Lord Nottingham was highly critical of
these sorts of arrangements, ruling that, by way of relief,
equity could reduce the sum owing to the “true and real”
value of the goods sold. Chancery judges of this period
were not very forthcoming about what in particular they
disliked about such agreements. It may be that their actions
were driven by a desire to prevent evasion of the usury
laws, a dislike of sales at an exorbitant price, a desire to
protect young heirs who often suffered from these
transactions or a combination of all three. 
Young heirs were also the victims of another method of
avoiding usury, the post obit bond. In return for an
immediate payment, the borrower promised that on the
death of his father or other relative he would repay a much
larger sum. Because the heir might die before he could
actually inherit there was a hazard, taking the post-obit
bond outside usury. Once again, Lord Nottingham was
outspoken in his criticism. In 1680, (Anon (1680)
unreported, (1961) 79 Selden Society 868), he thundered
that, “this infamous kind of trade and circumvention ought
by all means to be suppressed.”
Not everyone shared Lord Nottingham’s views. When
the same litigation came before Lord Keeper North he
dismissed the claim for relief despite calling it a “hazardous
bargain” (Barny v Beak (1682) 2 Chan Cas 136). It needed
a third hearing before Lord Jeffreys before Lord
Nottingham’s original decree was discharged (Berney v Pitt
(1686) 2 Vern 14). In doing so Lord Jeffreys used the term
“unconscionable” to describe the agreement. Batty v Lloyd
((1682) 1 Vern 142), another decision of Lord Keeper
North, sheds some further light on his motives. In that case
he made the point that those whose finances were in a poor
state of repair should not be able to demand favourable
terms. But the balance between lender and borrower was
frequently struck in the borrower’s favour. In Wiseman v
Beake ((1698) 2 Vern 121, 2 Freeman 111), the party
seeking relief, a 40 year old proctor in Doctors’ Commons,
was about as far away from a typical young heir as it was
possible to be. Yet he too secured relief. The tensions
between these two positions would bubble to the surface
all too frequently. 
A third factual situation resembled the post obit bond
but had even more serious consequences. It concerned an
expectant heir urgently in need of ready cash who sold his
expectancy and hence his future enjoyment of his estate at
an undervalue. Perhaps not surprisingly, Lord Nottingham
set such an agreement aside in Nott v Hill ((1682) 2 Chan
Cas 120). Lord Keeper North was not prepared to go as far
in Batty v Lloyd, but even he was unwilling to grant specific
performance of an agreement when the heir refused to
honour his bargain. In theory this position still left the
plaintiff a remedy in law for straightforward breach of
contract.                
It is difficult to draw very firm conclusions from these
early authorities. Examples of relief from a bad bargain are
uncommon and there are counter examples. The greatest
chance of success came when a bad bargain was combined
with the sale of an expectancy, fraud or advantage taking.
After 1750, a slightly clearer picture emerges with Lord
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Hardwicke’s attempt to rationalise the grounds of
equitable relief under the broad heading of fraud in Earl of
Chesterfield v Janssen ( (1750) 2 Ves Sen 125, 1 Atk 301).      
STRUCTURING THE GROUNDS FOR
EQUITABLE RELIEF AFTER 1750
In a letter to his friend, Lord Kames, Lord Hardwicke
would argue that ‘fraud is infinite’ and that ‘no invariable
rules can be established’. In these circumstances it seems
likely that when, in Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen, he set down
five heads of fraud it was not his intention to limit relief to
those who fell within one of his categories. In contrast, by
the end of the century Lord Thurlow, in Fox v Mackreth
((1788) 2 Bro Chan Cas 400), would explain that:
The Court will not correct a contract, merely because a man of
nice honour would not have entered into it; it must fall
within some definition of fraud; the rule must be drawn so as
not to affect the general transactions of mankind.    
The way in which Lord Hardwicke’s words came to be
accepted as a definitive statement is important for the way
that relief in Chancery would come to be structured
especially in the nineteenth century. The dominance of fraud
also killed off the prospect of an overarching doctrine of
unconscionability. Nevertheless, one category of equitable
fraud in particular had the potential to offer relief in a wide
variety of loan transactions. Lord Hardwicke identified that
category as fraud which was, “apparent from the intrinsic
nature and subject of the bargain itself; such as no man in his
sense and not under delusion would make on the one hand
and no honest and fair man would accept on the other.” 
The potential lay in the extent to which fraud of this sort
could be used as a ground for refusing specific
performance or setting aside an agreement or loan for an
inadequate price. Although the earliest decisions are quite
cautious, by the early 1740s Lord Hardwicke was
suggesting that the position might have changed.
Nevertheless, it is significant that these two decisions,
Barnardiston v Lingood ( (1740) 2 Atk 133) and Buxton v Lister
( (1746) 3 Atk 383), involved an expectant heir and
misrepresentation respectively. Matters reached a head in
1749, when in Underwood v Hitchcock ( (1749) 1 Ves Sen
279), Lord Hardwicke announced that specific
performance might be refused solely on the basis of an
inadequate price. 
It is difficult to be sure about the extent to which Lord
Hardwicke’s approach meant that equity was more likely to
refuse specific performance of annuities for the life of the
seller. There are two reported cases. In one specific
performance is granted and in the other refused (Lord
Carbery v Weston (1757) 1 Bro PC 429; Vaughan v Thomas
(1783) 1 Bro CC 556.)  By the late 1780s things had
moved on. By a clever sleight of hand, agreements
(including loans) for an inadequate price came to be more
closely regulated to the extent that agreements were set
aside. In order to avoid the fear that every sort of hard
bargain would be open to challenge in equity, Chancery
judges began to allow an inadequate price to be presented
as evidence of fraud. This allowed the change to be
presented in traditional terms – whether or not there was
a fraud. It also preserved a degree of flexibility. In non-
meritorious cases it was easy enough to rule that there was
insufficient evidence of fraud. Many of the same results
might easily have been reached under the existing rules
because an inadequate price was usually combined with
other kinds of wrongful behaviour.  
In one class of case equity took a more interventionist
line.  Where the only evidence of fraud was an inadequate
price the line between this position and the one where an
agreement was set aside for inadequate price is wafer thin.
In these circumstances in Heathcote v Paignon ( (1787) 1 Bro
Chan Cas 1) , which did not involve an heir and where
there was expressly stated to be no evidence of distress, the
agreement was set aside. For a short while, inadequacy of
price in its own right remained a ground for refusing
specific performance, but towards the turn of the century
it came to be restricted to evidence of fraud. Although the
rationale for relief had changed, the evidence is
inconclusive in terms of whether relief was more or less
likely than before. Where the transaction involved an heir
on the other hand the courts began to move away from the
paternalistic position which viewed all transactions with
heirs with suspicion. After Gowland v De Faria ((1810) 17
Ves Jun 20), a decision which involved an annuity, this strict
position was arguably relaxed. Henceforth, provided a fair
price could be shown, then the transaction stood.
The extent to which equity intervened in loan
transactions waxed and waned over time. There are too few
reported authorities to come to definitive conclusions but
it is evident that equity was not peripheral. Without
Chancery, those who fell outside the legal definition of
usury would certainly have been in a much worse position.
In a sense, this was a golden age of equity as far as this sort
of transaction was concerned. In the century that followed,
equity would be restructured and even the statutory
restrictions on usury removed. From an even longer
perspective, some of the tensions evident in eighteenth
century Chancery between protection of a borrower and
freedom of contract are still very much alive. 
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